4. Francesco Davide Ragno

Development vs. Anticommunism? The Kennedian ideals and the political class in Brazil during the early Sixties

ABSTRACT

The beginning of the Kennedy Presidency in the United States was perceived as a great change by the Brazilian political class, beyond ideological divisions and political affiliations. The launch of the Alliance for Progress program initially seemed to corroborate these widespread perceptions. With the passing of time, however, the political class in Brazil were divided around the interpretation of the universe of Kennedian ideals, recomposing old political fractures and previous ideological divisions. This essay intends to retrace the ways in which the Kennedian ideals entered the Brazilian public debate that gradually became more and more polarized. On the one hand there were those who emphasized the anticommunism characteristic that embodied Kennedian foreign policy. On the other hand, others focused on the notion of...
had finally along with the United Nations gained the support of almost all the African nations (with the exception of Liberia and South Africa) and most Asian nations. American prestige in the world had not therefore been elevated: but Kennedy, accusing his rival, the then vice-President Richard Nixon and the republican administration, betrayed his intention to implement a turn around.

Once achieving the presidency, Kennedy appeared to transformed his words sustained during the electoral campaign into concrete foreign policies: first of all, he presented himself as the promoter of a profound change in terms of international politics. Kennedy seemed to embody the characteristics of a different America, different from that represented during the first years of the Cold War: young, Catholic, not so close to the military environment, with an extensive congressional experience, Kennedy had produced to the world a perception of himself as being the man who would finally redefine the traditional paradigms of American foreign politics. This perception continues to grow throughout the whole western block. This happened, more specifically, in Latin America. In this context Kennedy immediately committed himself to improve operations to avoid a 'new Cuban revolution'. So, in March of 1961, summoning the ambassadors of Latin American countries in the United States, JFK communicated that in brief the US would start a new program of financing in order to promote the economic development of the Latin American area. A few months later, in

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fact, the Alliance for Progress would be launched.

In recent years, interest of the historiography toward the foreign politics of the Kennedy administration and, in particular, toward the relationship between the United States and Latin America during the early Sixties becomes increasingly dynamic, based on Latham's and Gilman's books. In this historiographical debate, this essay intends to add some new items on the connection between the political-economic development and the anti-Communist perspective, in the Kennedian Hemisphere policies. These two aspects, in fact, appeared firmly and coherently connected to the Modernization Theory and within the lines of Kennedian foreign policy that was inspired by this theory. And beginning with the necessity to consolidate Kennedian anticommunism with the politics of economic development that takes shape this essay: the idea underpinning this essay is that by re-centring the nexus of economic development and anti-communism is possible to understand the reception of Kennedy's discourse in Latin America; in this sense, this essay moves in an attempt to analyse the ways in which Kennedy's proposal was implemented in the Brazilian political reality. In this way, this essay takes shape from what David E. Engerman claimed: "widespread desire for higher levels of economic production, as well as conflicts over the path to higher production, defined the shape of international relations in the Cold War as well as the experiences of those who lived through it".

For these reasons, this essay will analyse firstly one of the principal political debate of the late Fifties in Brazil: the debate on the development. In the second and third parts, it will be analysed the reactions of Brazilian political class to the Kennedian proposals. In this way, the reception of the Kennedian ideals in Brazil would allow, also, to shed a new light on the Brazilian political cultures – well rooted cultures that, thanks to the current discourses of the international debate, were elaborated time and again. The Brazilian political movements appeared inclined to discuss certain Kennedian proposals and to incorporate them into their own contingent intentions.

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4 For a huge review of the historiography on Kennedy in Latin America, see Michael Dunne, ‘Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress: countering revolution in Latin America. Part II: the historiographical record’, International Affairs, 92 (2016), páginas 435-452.

The nationalistic development and its critics

Brazil of the late Fifties was a country restricted by enormous structural problems (above all, poverty) but endowed with an extreme dynamism. The construction from nothing to the new capital Brasilia (announced in 1956 and completed after only four years, in 1960) was the clearest representation of this vitality. The Presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek, during which this huge construction was realized, began an important operation in terms of the modernization of Brazil. Kubitschek and his group were inspired by the tasks of the newborn Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribe (ECLAC), a United Nations affiliated agency. In an article published in 1949, Raul Prebisch, executive secretary of the Commission, outlined that the industrialization would have been the milestone to promote a sustainable economic development at that time. In such a way, the Latin-American economies were to abandon a system based on the export of primary goods and, therefore, the budgets of the State would be made more independent by the fluctuations of the international prices of these primary goods.

Thanks to this reflection, Kubischek elaborated at first the “Directrizes Generais do Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento” (General Guidelines for a National Plan of Development) which was on the basis on the “Plano de Metas” (Targets Plan). This Plan was divided into five sectors (energy, transport, agriculture and food distribution, heavy industry, formation and technical qualification of the job) which corresponded, respectively, to the specific objectives of the plan. As Rafael R. Ioris argued, the success of the Plan was based “on the close interaction established between members of the federal bureaucracy and large, influential, and private economic interests”. Moreover, in 1956 Brazil, the memory of Getulio Vargas, who had been a central and divisive character in the political arena beginning from 1930 and leading up to 1954, was still vivid. Kubitschek based his political action upon the notion that the economic-social problems of the country would have been resolved thanks only to national unity, that went beyond party conflicts and the personal frictions of the past. Kubitschek himself outlined during his first message inaugurating the period of activity of the Congress, “it is essential now to unite the common efforts for the initial improvement and sincere practice of the democratic institutions”. This was the necessary condition to completely develop the “directions of the economical development that, parallel to the extent of our cultural evolution, contributes to consolidate the free and powerful Nation: a nation capable of being rewarded in prosperity, in justice, in safety and the whole well-being of the

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ongoing efforts of their children”\textsuperscript{10}. Kutbischek claimed that the State, in this process, had to complete the functions of “investidor supletivo” (supplementary investor), because the private capital at the time was not able to respond to the necessities of the country: this, however, would happen without inhibition in order to tighten the fields of participation of the private economic sectors\textsuperscript{11}. In this regard, the Conselho de Desenvolvimento (Development Council) had been created, as an organism that would have had to coordinate the projects of economic and social development of the Country and, therefore, in particular, of the “Plano de Metas”. The Conselho as the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico (BNDE), represented the technocratic apparatus that would have had to govern the so-called modernization of the country. Kutbischek, in other words, aspired to stimulate the private interest and to involve them in a complex universe of Commissions and Institutions that were born in the Fifties for the purpose of analysing and of governing the development of the Brazilian economy. It dealt with a long process that, for certain reasons, fluctuated stimulating the growth of the Brazilian bureaucracy and the birth of a new class of technocrats (economists and social scientists, \textit{in primis}), that developed thanks to some reflections produced by the ECLAC. In this way, Kutbischek and his administration were the promoters of a “nationalistic development”. A nationalism, that is, which “has a necessary purpose at present, during these decisive years, to work for the development”\textsuperscript{12}.

The connection between nationalism and desarrollismo (developmentalism) was not new to the political and cultural arena in Brazil. It was really from this point that, in 1955 the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB), an academic organization directly connected to the Minister of the Education, was formed. Beyond the different positions represented by the various members of the institute (among them the most remarkable were Helio Jaguaribe, Roland Corbisier, Alberto Guerreiro Ramos), it is possible to recognize a shared political culture founded upon the notion that it was possible and necessary to formulate an essential idea of national community in answer to an application for “emancipating development” of the country. Brazil, according to the ISEB intellectuals, has a semi-colonial status, that made independent economic growth impossible. From their prospective, the Brazilian situation in reality was not based simply upon economic presuppositions but it extended, moreover, to a cultural dimension. In this way, according to the members of the ISEB, in short, economic development would have had to benefit from an organic combination of all sectors of Brazilian society: in this way, therefore, the economic matters would merely have to galvanize in a unique way contributing to the promotion of the growth of the country and, particularly, of its industrialization. In other words, it was necessary to build “a narrative

\textsuperscript{10} Ivi, página 62.
\textsuperscript{11} Ivi, páginas 47-49.
of who we want to be as a nation, an image of a shared destiny which, in order to be viable, has to be defined by the very notion of development”: this message, beyond the ‘Messianic’ essence of the claim, embraced, for the most part, the start of a process of the Brazilian industrialization.

The relationship between the intellectuals of the ISEB and the Kubitschek administration, however, was anything but linear. Although there was similar attitude towards the diagnosis of the critical points of the Brazilian economy and towards the necessity to increase the levels of productivity to promote the industrialization of the country and although the Kubitschek government did not refrain from funding the institute, divergences on concrete measures to apply to the national economic industrialization matured. The focal point from which the principal discrepancies were born was that of the foreign capitals. Kubitschek was often appeared fin favour of the retrieval and the use of foreign investments to promote the development of Brazil. Because the State didn’t have the financial resources to sustain the heavy burden of the requirements of the country and because it seemed to be the only organization able to manage a stable economic development, these terms with which Roberto Campos and Lucas Lopes (collaborators of Kubitschek in the definition and in the implementation of the Targets Plan) were expressed.

The solutions proposed by the members of the ISEB were different, instead. These, in fact, refused the idea that the private capital could contribute to the economic development of the country; rather, the State, would have alone to finance the economic growth of the country. To this intention, Álvaro Vieira Pinto, one of the most relevant intellectual of the Iseb, sustained that: “We are led to conclude by the need to entirely reject the cooperation of the private exploitative external capital, in order to accomplish our development due to utilization of the capital generated inside the country by the work of [our] people”. Vieira Pinto claimed, therefore, that a development driven by foreign capital would not bring to the emancipation of the country. The industrialization promoted from the outside, he continued, would have represented a heavy hereditary flaw to disadvantage of the national interest because it would have prevented the connection among economic development and “progress of conscience”.


After all, however, within the institute, a univocal proposal didn’t emerge. Helio Jaguaribe, for instance, in his “O Nacionalismo na atualidade Brasileira”, maintained a not-dissimilar position from that of Kubitschek. Jaguaribe’s considerations especially focused on the exploitation of the oil resources, central issue for the Brazilian nationalistic movements and, in general, for Latin American nationalism. Despite the proposals of Jaguaribe, a radicalization of the positions of the ISEB occurred: the same Jaguaribe and the other more moderate exponents remained on the margins of the activities of the institute.

The Plano de Metas and, more generally, the political economy of the Kubitschek Presidency was also criticized by some exponents aligned to Orthodox economic liberalism. This refers not only to the economists Eugenio Gudin and Octavio Gouveia de Bulhões, but also to Carlos Lacerda, a prominent political figure of the UDN (União Democrática Nacional). In particular, Gudin was inspired by the 'orthodox' liberalist idea that the capitalist economy approximated the balance of maximum efficiency if and only if the market mechanisms could move freely. So with this in mind, the presence of the State in national economic life had to be reduced to a minimum. Without entering into the specific technicalities of political economy for which we refer to the volume of Bielschowsky, Gudin stressed that the two problems of Brazil were, on the one hand, the low productivity of capital and labour and, on the other, the widespread notion that industry and agriculture were synonymous, respectively, of productivity and poverty: “Industry or agriculture of good productivity is synonymous with prosperity”. Similarly, there were the open criticisms of the Kubitschek’s administration – accused of having increased the State investments enormously, financing them with a more significant (increasing) deficit of the State balance and an arise in taxes. Gudin, however, was a strong supporter of the need to attract foreign capital, considered indispensable resources to start a process of development in less-developed countries such as Brazil. In this light, in the absence of high national savings rates, investments could only come from foreign capital, as highlighted by Bulhões. Thus, driven by these reasons, he envisaged a more structured national financial system capable of promoting private foreign and Brazilian investments: “The improvement of the economic individual prosperity of the individuals will be all the more significant the more easily one can develop the technique and the accumulation of capital through the association of national and foreign resources.” The ideas that rose...
from the UDN to criticize the work of Kubitshek were not so different.

Others, again, argued against the idea that a project of development of the country should only be based on industrialization. This reflection was rooted in the fundamentalist and corporate vision that, during the Thirties, had increased in popularity in Brazil thanks to the works of Alberto Torres, Oliveira Vianna and Plinio Salgado\textsuperscript{22}. From these and other works linked to a single common political culture emerged the need to rediscover the foundations of a national community. A national community that had become corrupt over time and had lost community ties. This made, according to this interpretation, the redemption of redeeming Brazil and its people, corrupted by international capitalism, which was based on bourgeois and individualistic materialism. In particular, during the Fifties, Luis Amaral outlined the traits of the Brazil of the future: "It is natural to conclude that national policy must be agricultural. Brazil, therefore, as an agricultural country, can not practice the industrialist customs policy, namely, to maintain tariffs to protect national industry - much less: industrial protection - imports of foreign companies"\textsuperscript{23}. Agriculture was not simply the best instrument of economic progress in the country; agriculture, in addition, was the foundation of man's redemption and of the path to the highest peaks of civilization: "If man apprehends the necessity of practicing the 'doctrine of restitution' and adopts agricultural chemistry; and if the means of defence are used against the enemies of its plantations, agriculture attains its peaks and gives to social life the characteristics of civilization evolved to the highest degree"\textsuperscript{24}. It was the same purpose, moreover, that, as we have seen, Vieira Pinto and a part of the Isebians attributed to economic development based, vice versa, on the industrialization led by the State. Politics (and in particular political economy), using an eminently religious vocabulary, was the instrument to start the genesis of a new humanity\textsuperscript{25}.

Between the end of the Fifties and the beginning of the Sixties, finally, what was later called the "Theory of Dependency" began to take shape. In São Paulo, at the school of Florestan Fernandes, Octavio Ianni and Fernando H. Cardoso began to take their first steps\textsuperscript{26}. Deeply influenced by Marxist doctrine, these scholars focused their studies of those years on the analysis of Brazilian nationalism. For Cardoso, nationalism was the "ideology of this new model of economic development", a form of growth, subsidized by the State, based on a more equal

\textsuperscript{22} On this, see António Costa Pinto y Federico Finchelstein (eds.). \textit{Authoritarism and Corporativism in Europe and Latin America}, New York, Routledge, 2019.


\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ivi}, páginas IX.


distribution of national income, able to merge the bourgeoisie and working classes\textsuperscript{27}. Ianni, on the other hand, considered nationalism as an useful ideology to the national bourgeoisie in order to subjugate the proletarian class: for him, therefore, nationalism was an ineffective means to counteract what remained the great problem of the era, imperialism\textsuperscript{28}.

These different political cultures made possible the debate on the development in Brazil that was part of a broader reflection on domestic and foreign policy and on the economy of what were then called 'developing countries'. In this regard, the positions emerged during a seminar, entitled "Resistências à Mudança", organized by the Latin American Center for Research in Social Sciences - Claps in October 1959. On that occasion, sixty experts from twenty countries in the world focused on analysing the issues of development. The idea was to make different orientations within dialogue, especially in relation to the notion of 'progress', at the time in which the two paradigmatic models, Soviet and American were clearly defined\textsuperscript{29}. The Brazilian intellectual class, therefore, was fully aware of the international dimension of development. It was clear, as Odd Arne Westad pointed out, that the Cold War, for the Third World, was a struggle "for the future direction of their polities and their society, a conflict between the two versions of Western modernity that socialism and liberal capitalism seemed to offer"\textsuperscript{30}.

**Kennedy and Brazil in Quadros' Presidency: breaking the unanimous hope**

When Kennedy arrived at the White House, Brazilian politicians and intellectuals were in the middle of this debate. The perception that Kennedy's arrival to the US Presidency represented a novelty fell into the Brazilian political-economic-social reality: a peculiar reception of the idea followed, which also had to deal with the heavy legacy left not only by Vargas, but also from the Fifties, marked by the experience of Kubitschek and the lively debate on the development prospects of Brazil.

The wind of hope and general optimism that came from the United States was corroborated in Brazil by beginning of the presidency of Jânio Quadros, who leaded a coalition that opposed to Kubitschek. With the systematic use of demagogic rhetoric, he had conducted an electoral campaign focused entirely on the need to restore public morality in Brazil. Furthermore, Quadros won the election in 1960 but the vice Presidency went

\textsuperscript{27} Fernando H. Cardoso, ‘Desenvolvimento econômico e nacionalismo’, in Revista Brasiliense, 12 (1957), páginas 88-99.


to Jóao Goulart, a veteran politician close to both Kubitschek and Vargas, supported by the political opposition to Quadros. The perception of general optimism, caused by the Brazilian Presidential election, was demonstrated, among other things, by a high rate of voter turnout: the number of entitled voters had increased (in fact, doubled between 1945 and 1960) and, among these, the percentage of voters has also gone up (in the face of a high turnout reached in 1945, the elections of 1950 and 1955 recorded a gradual reduction in the percentage of persons who were entitled to vote, while the elections of 1960 revealed a reversal of this tendency).

There is no doubt, however, that, despite the general feeling of 'a novelty having taken place', important elements of continuity. In fact, with regard to the Kennedy idea that there were deep connections between the Cold War and the political-economic development in Latin America, it must be said that in May 1958 Kubitschek launched the so-called Operation Pan-America (OPA), founded on the need to promote a renewal of the ideal Pan-American universe to strengthen integration based on development. This proposal came a few weeks after the disastrous journey that Nixon had made through Latin America, where a deep anti-American sentiment had now taken root. Kubischek's project began to be implemented only after the deflagration of the Cuban revolution. In 1959, the Inter-American Development Bank, based on the principles of the OPA, was created within the Organization of American States (OAS). In the same year, the OAS itself approved the creation of a Special Committee to Study the Formulation of the New Measures for Economic Cooperation, which clearly recalled the connection between economic underdevelopment and tensions for representative democracy in Latin America.

In this regard, in September 1960, with the Act of Bogotá, in the American hemisphere, "measures for social improvement and economic development within the framework of the Pan American Operation” was established. These were also the years in which seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) gave birth to Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in Montevideo. Inspired by the European integration, the seven States agreed to a gradual reduction of tariffs and customs restrictions, which in twelve years would have led to an annulment of the same, outlining an area of common market. The principles, the rules and the new institutional agencies for the administration and the government of the association were established and, at the same time, the terms of the collaboration with the ECLAC and with other international organizations working in


32 For the electoral data, see Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [available on line at http://seculoxx.ibge.gov.br, last access 03/11/2018].


34 Cited in Jeffrey Taffet. Alliance for Progress..., op. cit., páginas 13-19.
the field of economic development were defined. Economic and development issues were fully entrenched in the international dynamics of the American continent and, therefore, in the processes that governed the events of the Cold War both for reasons of Latin-American political culture (the Kubischek-sponsored OPA was the result of a re-elaboration of Panamericanism which was so successful in the early part of the twentieth century) both for reasons of political contingency (Vice-President Nixon was not well regarded and the Cuban revolution was now complete).

This was the national and international context that received the notice of the election of Kennedy. This, as has been said, gave rise to widespread hope in all sectors of Brazilian public opinion: both in the Brazilian political arena and society prevailed an extremely positive image of the United States and Kennedy. There was a sort of transverse “sympathy” that crossed both the government and the opposition. This element is particularly interesting, especially considering the profound political radicalization that had taken place in Brazil (and, in general, throughout Latin America) in the early Sixties. In fact, the idea was circulated that Kennedy could rebuild that virtuous dialogue between the United States and Latin America that ended with the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and with the consequent end of the so-called ‘good neighbour policy’: acting on the basis of Modernization Theory, JFK embodied the democratic tradition that rejected isolationism. In addition, he appeared as “the man of destiny and desire who will know how to value and actualize the message of the American revolution, adapting it to the needs of time, as if responding to the challenge that the American leadership faces in the current historical constellation”.

The works of Kennedy in the US Congress, as well the political culture of his fellow intellectuals (from Kenneth Galbraith to Walt W. Rostow), were well-known in Brazil. And starting from this idea, widely perceived (that is, that there was a change of trend in the dynamics of relations with the United States), that a certain scepticism had begun to grow, among the Brazilian public opinion: good relations with the new US presidency was considered as the opening of “a credit of trust” and it was hoped, therefore, that Kennedy was shrewd in grasping this opportunity. The idea was that the change was necessary, according to an important part of Brazilian society. “What we no longer want is that an individual political speak improperly in the name of the entire continent, without taking

38 The expression was used both by Barbosa Lima Sobrinho and by Paulo Silveira a few months after the first from the latter Cfr. Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, ‘Eleição do Presidente Kennedy’, op. cit.; Paulo Silveira. ‘Kennedy e a América Latina’, in Última Hora (hereafter UH), 20 de enero 1961, página 3.
into account our position, no doubt contrary to the irremediable antagonism between the United States of North America and the Soviet Union. [...] We demand a real fulfilment of the duties of reciprocity. We no longer accept military cooperation agreements, which bind us to compromises on future situations different from the present": thus, with a decisive approach and strong words, the deputy Bocayuva Cunha expressed himself in the House of Deputies\textsuperscript{39}. Although some transformations were tangible, at least in terms of language and approach, in the eyes of a part of the Brazilian ruling class it was essential that the hopes were not turned into pious illusions\textsuperscript{40}.

On the columns of the “Jornal do Brasil”, some possible resistance began to present in the Brazilian society: from the communists to the 'frenetic' anti-communists, passing through the “professional nationalists”, according to which that wrote that “Jânio Quadros goes to the United States to deliver the oil, or whoever defends the thesis that it is necessary to take Fidel Castro’s head for 30 dollars of silver, or whoever moves the strings for the return of military to politics”; a change of this entity would, therefore, go beyond “those who insist on speaking for the left and for right in a world that, not to disappear, has to become ambidextrous” because the most important target was that defined “a policy of peaceful economic, political and social development, starting in the American continent and becoming an example for the whole world”\textsuperscript{41}.

And it was always the same newspaper that showed some characteristics of the hope for change: first, it would have to change the international policy developed by Eisenhower that gave “a quasi-absolute priority [...] to private capital as a source of investment that Latin American nations need for their development”\textsuperscript{42}: for this purpose, the new President would “direct to Latin America a flow of public capital to be applied in accordance with a global plan and that could be granted in the form of loans which would not be used to keep dictatorships such as those of Trujillo, Somoza, Duvalier or Stressner in power nor to keep certain oligarchic groups in the hands of formally democratic regimes”. The internal development of the Latin American countries and, in particular, that of Brazil would have received the impulse from public funding from the United States, aimed at promoting democratic political regimes and eroding the power of autocratic political system. In this context, public capital would have been the main driving force of the economy (“Public capital for grassroots enterprises and private capital for secondary enterprises - to fill the gaps left by our own private capitals, not to compete with them”)\textsuperscript{43}. The “Jornal do Brasil” argued that the US public capital, aimed at encouraging economic development in other countries, should be reserved for systems that guaranteed the holding of free elections and did not try to enjoy financing by exploiting the dynamics of the Cold War, i.e. using the pretext of anti-communism\textsuperscript{44}. Even if the US

\textsuperscript{40} ‘Mudança de linguagem’, \textit{JdB}, 14 de Enero 1961, página 3.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
The intimate anti-Communist nature of the Kennedy program, however, was marked strongly in the columns of the liberal newspaper, “Tribuna da Imprenta”. As Stefan Baciu wrote the day after the presentation of the Alliance for Progress introduced by Kennedy to the ambassadors of the Latin American countries in Washington, “The Kennedy proposal is, without a doubt, an effective weapon not only for economic development but, at the same time, for the active defence of democracy”; the main threats to democratic regimes came precisely from those “powerful extra-hemisphere forces whose main interest is to create in Latin America an atmosphere of uneasiness and agitation which will easily open the door to the movements of a totalitarian character, which have already established a very dangerous spearhead in America, carefully guarded by Soviet remote control”; hence the JFK program, which was based on the realization of a “verdadeira revolução” (real revolution) whose purpose was to guarantee peace in the hemisphere, a peace founded on the very close union between freedom and economic development45. The need to establish an indispensable link between economic and social development, on the one hand, and respect for political and civil liberties, on the other, was the leitmotiv proposed several times by Baciu and, in general, by the newspaper columnists46.

The “new frontier” of US foreign policy was transposed in many ways in Brazilian politics: there were those who emphasized its propensity for the political and economic development of the Latin American countries and, conversely, those who detected its strong anti-communist characterization. These two readings which, in some respects, appear to be complementary but which, in the Brazilian politics, responded to two conflicting visions. Even before Kennedy's election, in fact, an editorial of “Jornal do Brasil” showed how “Anti-communism is not an intelligent or democratic response to the challenge that communism makes to us”, instead, “in Brazil, where democracy is still a tender plant, as Mr. Octávio Mangabeira claimed, anti-communism, as a political orientation, can only have poor results”47. This divergence of views emerged immediately, when Kennedy and his inner group had to face the first international test bench: the case of Cuban Revolution. On this, Eisenhower had left a heavy legacy to JFK: one of the last acts of the Eisenhower presidency was breaking of diplomatic relations with the Castro regime.

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to the Bay of Pigs, in April 1961, Brazil’s reaction was not long in coming.

On the one hand there were those who compared the Castro regime to that of Nazi Germany and who therefore applauded the attempt to invade the anti-Castro forces. These, according to this interpretation, represented those “democratic forces in the war against communism”. In this perspective, Cuba represented nothing more than the Soviet bloc on Western Hemisphere: the presence of the pro-Soviet Castro’s regime was, therefore, an attack “against the whole America”, considering that “the world today is divided into two great political currents in manifest friction. One of them leads to the elimination of all the democratic achievements of the last centuries - the communist current - because while it claims to seek through it social equality and best distribution of goods, it try to achieve the destruction of freedom and political equality”. These words belonged to Hamilton Prado, a deputy elected in the ranks of the Partido Trabalhista Nacional and founder, in early 1961, the inter-party parliamentary group, Ação Democrática Parlamentar, which aimed to limit the communist infiltration in Brazilian society. The conclusions reached by the deputy Prado were clear: Castro regime was a foreign body introduced into the Americas and, therefore, was to excluded from the OAS.

At the same time, another part of Brazilian public opinion was sympathetic to the “Cuban laboratory” defined in no uncertain terms as “heroic”: Jesus Soares Pereira, for example, wrote from the columns of “Última Hora”: “Cuba was a laboratory in which a Latin people experience socialism. In a world more sympathetic than ours, today, there would even be sympathy for the Guinea pig [Cuban experiment], because all will benefit from the teaching that it would bring”. Then there was who, like the deputy Fernando Santana, thought that the responsibility of the proximity of the Castro regime to the Soviet bloc lied with the US government. In this sense, the reasons for the Cuban revolution resided in the “foreign plunder” by American capitalism and Kennedy, as Eisenhower had done, in defence of those interests tried to tighten the Latin American ranks, “on the pretext of being oriented [the Cuban revolution] by communism”. And then, the action and statements of President Kennedy “constitute an aberration [...] in defence of the right of intervention of the United States in a Latin American nation, on the pretext of defending that country's security, which we would represent no less than the reproduction of the old Hitlerian aphorism of the living space, if we would not like to look first at the old fable of the wolf and the lamb of La Fountaine”. The deputy Oswaldo Lima Filho, in short, noted the existence of a red thread between Hitler and Kennedy, both estimated by the “law of the fittest”.

50 DCN, 9 de Mayo1961, página 3048.
52 DCN, 9 de Mayo 1961, página 3048.
54 DCN, 9 de Mayo1961, página 3049.
reference to La Fontaine, clarifies this aspect): this parallelism, however, did not corroborate the anti-American sentiment that so successful at that time in Latin America: the perception, therefore, was that the United States (in this case like Nazi Germany) had built a hemispheric alliance in order to exploit economically the Latin American countries. In this sense, the Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista (which included many deputies including Lima Filho and Santana) made a public declaration in which the hope was expressed that JFK “seeks to prevent the United States from being blamed for an undue intervention in the political destinies of the Republic of Cuba, where the Revolutionary Government, with the massive support of the people, carries out a process of political and social emancipation of the highest significance for the destinies of all the peoples of Latin America”.

This approach, in certain aspects, inspired the words of President Quadros when he argued that “The Cuban revolution was the inevitable result of a damaging, appalling process of spoliation of a people by bad governments.” At this juncture, the position of the Brasilian government remained very ambiguous. This feature particularly emerged when the Brazilian President met his Argentine counterpart in Uruguaiana a few days after the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt. At the end of this meeting, Quadros and the Argentine President, Arturo Frondizi, did not express any clear position on this point. In the “Jornal do Brasil” it was written that “Democratic Latin America has not been able to unite and contain the United States on its geographical borders and Cuba within certain ideological limits. [Democratic Latin America] did not know how to solve the worst internal crisis that this continent has ever seen - that of the struggle between the American power and a small nation that, in order to challenge it, sought extra-continental support. […] What has been lacking is someone who, instead of ignoring the question or just saying that he was apprehensive, has the courage to tell Kennedy that he can not occupy Cuba and tell Fidel that he can not surrender to the Soviet Union; [someone who has the courage] to demand the suspension of the war of nerves (and bullets) and to affirm that the social question (which generated all this) is not solved with shootings or amphibious operations.” This form of ‘hesitation’ (as the newspaper defined a few weeks later) was also evident in the confused words of the prominent figure of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, San Tiago Dantas, a who shortly thereafter would be appointed Brazilian ambassador to the UN without assuming the office, because in September 1961 he would become Minister of Foreign Affairs. Starting from the interruption of the institutional mechanisms typical of democratic systems that was progressively occurring in Cuba, Dantas also emphasized that “one can not forget that the revolution represented the most powerful and unassuming act of struggle against economic oppression, represented mainly by the great American interests.”

which were evident limits to the realization of “an authentic work of development and emancipation”; for the Cuban case, therefore, there was a clash between two principles guaranteed by the Charter of Bogotá, “the first is the principle of non-intervention, the second is that of fidelity to the representative democratic regime and respect for human rights”; he continued, however, hoping that both the Brazilian diplomacy and that of all the states of the American hemisphere “would keep ideas, proposals and suggestions open, for the long haul of the negotiations. Negotiate yet, always negotiate. And think that the American cause will be endangered on the day we consecrate a defect in the democratic phalanx of the peoples of this hemisphere”\(^61\).

In short, the viscosity of this point did not limit the hope of a peaceful resolution whose terms, however, continued to appear very nebulous.

Kennedy, the Alliance for Progress and the “Cold Warriorization” of the Brazilian development

Just few weeks after the presentation of The Alliance for Progress (launched in March 1961), Kennedy had lost the unanimous support previously gained among the Brazilian society. There were those who asked for, as had been done with the Marshall Plan in Europe at the end of the Second World War, “the orderly fixation of goals and priorities and programs in the short term”, able to stimulate Brazilian and Latin-American development, starting from “a closer economic integration among Latin American countries and the expansion of their export markets”: which meant stimulating a process of “rationalization of the processes of economic and social development, through appropriate programming of national and foreign investments”\(^62\). The correlation with the Marshall Plan showed on one hand the desire that US capital could stimulate the economic development of Brazil. Moreover, it stressed even more the intimate anti-Communist nature of the Alliance for Progress. The anti-communist action in Brazil and, more generally, in Latin America also declined through the promotion of an ever greater free trade. On the other hand, there were those who stressed the limits of this type of economic development, pointing the finger at the risk of ‘Koreanizing’ Latin America, allowing the free entry of foreign products into national markets. In this case, “paradoxically, aid would be creating unemployment, insecurity, misery and pockets of unrest”\(^63\). In such a sense, the Alliance should not have been an entity to promote the arrival of foreign capitals in Brazil: rather, it should promote “to the elimination of misery in Brazil, at least ;[and] it will be indispensable that they proceed according to the interests of the national community, sometimes contrary to those of the large foreign consortia”\(^64\). The Alliance, in this perspective, was stripped of the anti-communist attribute and, therefore, should not have promoted a model of capitalist

\(^{64}\) ‘Mudança tardia’, HU, 7 de Julio 1961, página 7.
economic development. Rather, the idea of a development based on planning and programs; a development capable of reaffirming once again that “freedom [...] becomes the outgrowth of equality”\textsuperscript{65}.

With the resignation of Jânio Quadros (occurred at the end of August 1961) and the coming to power of João Goulart, these different interpretations of the Alliance for Progress and, more generally, of the ideal of the Kennedy universe underwent a process of profound radicalization\textsuperscript{66}. Goulart clearly expressed his desire to follow up on the foreign policy initiated by his predecessor. Nevertheless, it was clear that the main parliamentary forces that supported the President Goulart remained divided on the subjects of foreign policy (one, imbued with visceral anti-Americanism, represented by Leonel Brizola, and the other, more moderate, which gave voice, among other things, San Tiago Dantas). Likewise, the radicalization of the cold war climate, both in the world arena and in internal politics, placed limits on the presidential action. Do not forget that in those years two of the deepest crises of the cold war period (the missile crisis in Cuba and that of the Berlin Wall) broke out and that, in Brazil, with the arrival of Goulart to the presidency, the IPES (Instituto de Pesquisas and Estudos Sociais), which is heavily involved in criticizing the action of the President-in-Office.

\textsuperscript{65} Jânio Quadros. ‘Brazil’s New Foreign Policy’, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 1 de Octubre 1961.
\textsuperscript{69} João Goulart, ‘Discurso no banquete oferecido pelas associaçoes americano-brasileiras’, 6 de abril 1962, in Marcelino Wainelle Brito (ed.). \textit{Discursos Selecionados
of the concept of democracy: it was not simply a system useful for selecting the ruling class, but also a system capable of guaranteeing economic and social equality. At the same time, San Tiago Dantas claimed that saving democracy means eliminating inequalities. Promoting, in short, progress capable of eliminating inequalities, democratic institutions would be strengthened.

In foreign policy, President Goulart set out to guarantee the so-called “self-determination of nations”, i.e. the non-interference of a third State in internal affairs. In this regard, during his visit to the United States which took place in April 1962, he maintained that “the establishment of the Organization of American States represents, therefore, the formal recognition by all the Governments that cooperation between sovereign States, no matter how intimate it may be, gives no right to any of them, not even to the Organization which they are composed, to act in a field reserved exclusively for the internal sovereignty of nations”. In this way, Goulart took part in the debate on the break-up of diplomatic relations with Cuba. Brazil, in fact, was among those states that abstained when, in January 1962, the anti-Castro motion was put to a vote during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS countries. Precisely on that occasion, in reference to the Cuban case, the “Jornal do Brasil” reported that: “Chancellor San Tiago Dantas defended the thesis that this principle contains more perfect forms and less perfect forms [of the Democratic regimes]. The most perfect form based on free and periodic elections. Among the imperfect forms, he said, there is the manifestation of the national will through a revolutionary movement. In this case, the recognition of a Government, which was born, is based precisely on the principle of self-determination”. Brazil, according to this perspective, should have defended all those Latin American countries that were ‘perfectly democratic’ or self-determined. The Brazilian government did not seem to change its attitude even after the events of the October 1962 missile crisis. Brazil, in fact, remained a firm supporter of the respect for Cuban territorial sovereignty: “We always protest against military intervention in Cuba because we always recognize to all countries [...] the right to free self-determination. We have admitted as legitimate the right of Cuba to defend itself against possible hardships that would force or subjugate its sovereignty, or impede the right of self-determination of the Cuban people.”

While the United States negotiated with all the countries of the Continent in order to reach a position of unequivocal condemnation in the Organization of American States against Cuba (accused for having threatened the security of the Hemisphere with the attempt to install Soviet missiles), there was a part of the
political community in Brazil that perceived how Kennedy defined as democratic only those regimes close to their point of view. Evidently, democracy was “reserved for the free peoples of this free hemisphere, but only to get married with Washington”74. The logic (expressed here with ironic tones) was that of "surrender or die" and was brought back to McCarthyism, which until a few years before had been popular in the USA and which, according to Adalgisa Nery, was also nourished by the then Secretary of State, Dean Rusk75. Thus, the idea -that was being furthered- was that the Alliance for Progress was another detrimental instrument to impose US private interests abroad: “Here is the Alliance for Progress, a great opportunity to solidify in positive and realistic terms the continental coexistence. But nothing about illusory social assistance. Immediate support for the economic development of the Latin American nations, this is the program that the peoples of the continent are waiting for”76. The editorial of Pinheiro Neto echoed the words of Lucio Hauer who, during a session of the House of Deputies, said that “The aid promised through the Alliance for Progress will be far from producing the efficacy which certain propagandists preach, just as it will not respond in any way as it does not respond to the unbearable demands of progress, culture and well- being that stand today, throughout Latin America”77. The Alliance for Progress was defined as a “humiliating crumb”, typical of the policy generally conducted by the United States that with “30 coins” would have liked to buy "the key to solving the problems of our economic development": in this sense, Hauer continued, “the ‘Alliance for Progress’ is the euphemistic expression of American neo-colonialism. It intends to marshal the imperialist plunder of the Latin American peoples and prevent the realization of their economic independence”78. A perception, this, not unlike that of the deputy Celso Brant, according to which American actions were driven by the aim of conditioning the Brazilian economic development: “The Trojan horse of this interference ... is the so-called ‘Alliance for progress’ form of neo-colonialism by which the American government is going to the furthest corners of our country”79. In this sense, as Jonathan C. Brown argued, the communist movements

77 DCD, 24 de Abril 1962, página 1628.
“made common cause with the nationalists”, rejecting the Alliance progress\(^80\).

And then, within just over two years of the Kennedy administration, the hope for change had already turned into disillusion, at least in part of Brazilian public opinion. Leonel Brizola’s prophecy seemed to come true. In October 1961, he said: "I am convinced, therefore, that many American public figures really want to compete for the elimination of the misery of our underdeveloped peoples, whether through programs such as the Alliance for Progress, or through reforms that are advising its southern neighbours. I am equally convinced that these public figures, assured of the sincerity of their intentions, will soon be convinced of the quasi ineffectiveness of their efforts"\(^81\). Thus, in 1963, some came to argue that there was “a funeral for the Alliance for Progress”\(^82\). The promises and the consequent illusion of economic development in Latin America, development supported by the United States went to meet a real failure. “The activities of the Alliance for Progress in Brazil have resulted in almost no employment or investment of dollars for the development of the country, with the aggravating fact that its program always implies the practice of a program of politicization and operational eclecticim that is unfavourable to Brazilian interests”\(^83\).

However, there was another interpretation of the Alliance for Progress. In the dynamics of the Cold War, in fact, it was interpreted as an instrument to promote liberal democracy and free trade, as opposed to what was being done by the Soviet Bloc regimes. The reference, in this case, was to the Marshall Plan that had not only allowed the economic development of European states after World War II, but above all had strengthened a liberal political system and a market economy: all, in stark contrast to what, in those same years, was happening in countries inspired by Soviet models. There was also a constant connection with the experience of the European Economic Communities and, more generally, with the events of the integration of Western Europe. They were once again interpreted as a useful tool both to promote economic growth and to oppose the Soviet model of development. In this sense, the Deputy Raimundo Padilha, in the House of Deputies, indicated the temporal proximity between the launch of the Alliance for Progress program and the construction of the Berlin Wall: “On the one hand, the effort inspired by freedom, in the sense of extending it economically, raising personal standards of life of millions of human beings […]. On the other hand, the attempt to avoid the daily exodus”\(^84\). In this

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sense, the European Economic Communities, as well as the Alliance for Progress, shared the same political culture that developed from an idea of “freedom of tradition and mobilization of labour and capital, labour force and capital”: they were, in other words, “a challenge that the liberal economy ... throws at the so-called interventionist or socialist nations”\(^{85}\).

The Alliance for Progress could only be interpreted within the dynamics of the Cold War. In this case, supporting the Alliance for Progress meant, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, opposing the Soviet bloc and any Soviet Union interference in the Western Hemisphere. This was especially true when the USSR tried to undermine the basis of cohesion as in the case of the installation of missiles in Cuba in October 1962. On that occasion, supporting Kennedy in the isolation of Cuba accompanied the ‘virtuous’ attempt to limit the influence of the Soviet bloc on the American continent, avoiding the domino effect that would have led to the birth of other revolutionary movements inspired by the Castro regime. “A victory of Kennedy over Cuba will have an immediate repercussion, also critical on Brazilian policy, with the definitive discouragement of the tendencies of a situation of semi-left with which Brazil seeks internally a appropriate solution to the internal problems and those coming from repercussions of the global crisis in our country. A disaster of American policy, now formulated with the decision by President Kenendy, would lead to an immediate and rapid progress of the left not only in Brazil as in the whole Continent”\(^{86}\). The visit of Robert Kennedy to Goulart in December 1962 is therefore welcome to strengthen the continental restrictions and to reiterate with greater force the idea that “we do not want governments dominated by communists. […] It is this that Mr. Robert Kennedy said to Mr. Jango Goulart”\(^{87}\).

From this, it was clear that the idea that the Alliance for Progress was a lifeline “That Latin American democracy has to survive. Thirteen countries, which recognized the danger posed by the Castro-communists, stand in common, demanding sanctions. If this front still includes dictatorships like Nicaragua, Haiti and Paraguay, the fact does not mean that, sooner than expected, the hour of the Somoza, the Duvalier and the Stroessner has come”\(^{88}\). The Alliance for Progress, therefore, would have been, according to Baciu, an instrument to break the balance of autocratic regimes and to promote, on the contrary, democratic regimes. The latter were “both internally and not internationally, presuppose respect for human dignity and the individuality of nations”: this meant that the Alliance for progress would create a virtuous circle, giving rise to “systems of cooperation and planning that contains with the spontaneous support of individuals and nations, and at the same time the impositions of force that originate from totalitarian spirits must be repelled”\(^{89}\).

Conclusion

The death of JFK in Dallas, in November 1963, and the coup of 1964 (when the military dismissed Goulart from the Presidency) suddenly solved the controversy between the different interpretations of the Kennedian ideals in Brazil. In certain aspects, the events of the Alliance for Progress, in the first years of the Kennedy administration, are sufficient to clarify the methods and terms with which the Brazilian political class had (and would have) used the dynamics of the Cold War. In other words, Kennedy's proposals had entered the public debate in Brazil, generating a broader discussion around the very nature of the national political and economic system. In fact, in the Brazilian context, they had been re-modulated and at least partly crushed by the progressive radicalization of the national political scene.

In this sense, a peculiar vision of democracy had been structuring, according to which democracy was not that system which, by guaranteeing civil and political freedoms, selected the ruling class: "There is no democracy, only with theoretical liberty, exclusively judicial, with exclusively academic equality", Celso Brant said to the House in May 1962, criticizing the Alliance for Progress⁹⁰. Democracy, in the conception of Brant as well as that of many other Brazilian political leaders, should have been that political system capable of guaranteeing equality and social justice; that system capable of guaranteeing “economic independence”, possible at that moment only through “a foreign policy [...] of autonomy and independence”⁹¹.

On the contrary, an opposing interpretation of the Alliance for Progress had been affirmed: some believed, in fact, that this was a useful tool to strengthen the Western (and anti-Soviet) block and to favour, therefore, the anti-communism that would be accompanied to an economic development based on private initiative: the individual, not the State, had to take charge of the growth of Brazil⁹². Two opposing interpretations that they had found in the Kennedian ideal universe a further ground for confrontation and radicalization.

In this sense, this article focused on the attention of the Brazilian ruling class (both intellectuals and politicians) gradually shifted from the problem of economic and social development at the beginning of the Sixties. This sheds new light on Kennedy's foreign policy, considering that JFK was one of the first promoters of the U.N. proclamation of the 1960s as the “decade of development”. With the implementation of the ideas of Modernization Theory in the Alliance for Progress, in fact, the development issues seemed to lose their centrality in the Brazilian political and social context. In this sense, if the Alliance for Progress had been thought, among other things, as an effort to put the Castro revolution in the corner and avoid the emergence of a “second Cuba”, the results seem to be distinct. It seems, on the contrary, that the events of the Castro

⁹⁰ DCD, 12 de Mayo 1962, página 2346.
⁹¹ Ibidem.
revolution made the success of the Alliance of Progress very difficult.

Kennedy's presidency, in fact, had begun with substantial and unanimous support from the Brazilian political class towards the newly elected President. This unanimous support reflected positively on the perception that Brazilian public opinion had towards Kennedy's proposals for the development of Latin America. Over the months, the breakdown of this unanimity has conditioned the debate on the Alliance for Progress, due to hemispheric changing scenarios (i.e. the evolution of Castro's Regime). In other words, we have witnessed the process of “cold warriorization” of the Alliance for Progress in Brazil, separating the three pillars on which it was based: representative democracy, economic development and anti-communism. These three pillars, in Kennedy's view, should have moved in the same direction. In the Brazilian case, instead, they moved in distinct directions: someone support the anti-communism pillar; someone the economic-development pillar. In such a way, these interpretations clashed in the Brazilian politics: none profoundly considered the pillar of representative democracy. And then if the Alliance was one of the US responses to prevent the Cold War from further dividing the Western Hemisphere, the failure of the Alliance occurred precisely because of the crystallization of the typical Manichaean divisions of the Cold War. Those nationalist groups, which had formed their own idea of development during the 1950s, criticized strongly the Alliance for Progress using the rhetoric of anti-imperialism, whose roots are very deep in inter-American relations, going beyond the typical time-frame of the Cold War93.

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